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I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Setting aside the case determinative issues of timeliness of suit and the statute of frauds,
EVCO's burden in this case was to establish a contractual relationship with Cedar Street. Depending
on the type of contract it could establish, if any, EVCO then had to establish its entitlement to either
expectation damages or quantum meruit damages, i.e., for its labor and materials. EVCO pied in its
complaint that it had a "written contract with Cedar Street." (R. at 3).

When it could not

demonstrate that there was a written contract, it claimed after trial that its contract was part express
and part implied. (Motion to Augment, Ex. 2, p. 6). 1 Contrary to EVCO's own admissions
regarding its "implied contract" with Cedar Street, and despite its earlier ruling on summary
judgment that, based on the undisputed facts, there was no express contract (R., p. 245), the district
court determined after trial that there was an express contract. (R., p. 266-67). In its appellate brief,
EVCO repeatedly claims it had a "contract with Cedar Street," but distances itself from the obvious
legal conclusion that any such contract, if one existed, was an implied in fact contract. The district
court misapplied clear Idaho contract law to find an "express contract" based on the "conduct of the
parties" and the amount of the contract based upon the "benefit" conferred upon the School District.

It is Seaboard's contention that there was no contract between Cedar Street and EVCO, however,
if a contract is found to exist, the only contract that could have potentially existed between the parties
was an implied in fact contract.

1

Seaboard filed a Motion to Augment the record to include EVCO's Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law after trial in which EVCO admitted as follows: "EVCO's
contract with Cedar Street was part express and part implied." (Motion to Augment, Exhibit 2,
p. 6).
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Further, EVCO claims it timely provided its notice of claim to Seaboard, but manipulated
its billing invoice to do so. On January 29, 2005, the School District took occupancy of the building
which was substantially completed as of that date. EVCO's notice of claim was untimely, as was
its action on Seaboard's bond.
EV CO also cannot avoid the statute of frauds. There are no exceptions to the requirement
that the alleged contract be in writing. Further, the School District's specifications and the prime
contract, as well as Ormond Builders' subcontract with Cedar Street, required that Cedar Street and
EVCO contract only by a written agreement. (Ex. N, p. 23).
Finally, EVCO is not entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. Attorney's fees under Idaho Code
§ 54-1927 are not available on appeal and EVCO has no other basis to obtain such an award.

II.ARGUMENT
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT
ITS FINDINGS OF FACT DEMONSTRATED AN EXPRESS CONTRACT
BETWEEN EVCO AND CEDAR STREET.
As a matter of hornbook law, Seaboard's liability, if any, under its bond is measured by

Cedar Street's potential liability to EVCO. EVCO is not entitled to a greater recovery against
Seaboard that it could have obtained against Cedar Street. "Since the obligation of a surety is
accessory to that of a principal debtor, it follows that the liability of the surety is ordinarily measured
by the liability of the principal, and cannot exceed it. This is also the case if a bond mirrors a
surety's responsibilities by way of statute; in that the surety's responsibilities cannot exceed those
embodied in the statute." 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Suretyship § 20 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
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"As a general rule, a surety on a bond is not liable unless the principal is, and, therefore, he
may plead any defense available to the principal. Thus, a surety may set up in defense to an action
against him any matter or any act of the creditor that operates as a discharge of the principal from
liability." 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Suretyship § 88 (2008) (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, EVCO and
Cedar Street's contractual relationship, if any, is critical and directly at issue in determining the
extent of Seaboard's liability under its bond, if any.
1.

No Express Contract Was Formed Because Cedar Street Intended a Written
Contract to Finalize Any Agreement.

EVCO offers little discussion regarding Cedar Street's undisputed intent to have a written
contract to formalize any agreement. Cedar Street consistently indicated its intent to finalize any
agreement, if one was ever reached, in an executed writing. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 43, 1.17 - p. 34, I. 25; p.
64, I. 2-7; p. 78, I. 22-25; Ex. M). EVCO bore the burden of proof at trial to show any alleged
express contract was binding, in spite of the failure to consummate the written agreement. See
Miller Const. Co. v. Stresstek, 108 Idaho 187, 188, 697 P.2d 1201, 1202 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing
Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396,400,582 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1978)); Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho
690, 697, 838 P.2d 293, 300 (1992). EVCO failed to meet this burden.
As the district court noted in its summary judgment order, "[u]ndisputed facts reveal that
there was never an express contract between EVCO and Cedar Street." (R. at 245). Rather, there
were a series of negotiations preliminary to a written subcontract and, although the parties looked
to enter into a written contract, it was never consummated by either party. EVCO prepared and
submitted a number of bid proposals and Cedar Street submitted a blank subcontract, which was

never signed by either party. (Ex. F). Cedar Street's owner testified it was always his intent to
consummate any agreement with a formal written contract. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 64, I. 2-7; p. 78, I. 22-25).
No evidence was presented to counter this testimony. Pursuant to its Proof of Claim to Seaboard,
EVCO claimed there was a "written" contract. Rather, there was a series of documents, which
EVCO argues creates a "written" contract. (Ex. 2). There is no dispute that both Cedar Street and
EVCO intended to set forth their agreement by a signed written document to finalize their
negotiations. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 12, I. 21 -p. 16, I. 6; p. 20, I. 9-18; p. 42, I. 13 -p. 46, I. 3; p. 78, I. 2225, p. 109, I. 24 - p. 112, I. 9). Where there is no dispute the parties intended to be bound only by
a written agreement, no express contract is formed without the executed written agreement. See

Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396, 400, 582 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1978); Jntermountain Forest Mgt.,
Inc. v. Louisiana Pac/fie Corp., 136 Idaho 233,236, 31 P.3d 921,924 (2001).
Contrary to EV CO' s contention, Cedar Street never directed EVCO to "start work." Rather,
Cedar Street requested that EVCO provide a very limited amount of materials, back cans (no labor
was requested), in the very same document that it asked EVCO to review the subcontract. The
request to review the subcontract can be interpreted as nothing other than further evidence of Cedar
Street's continued intent to enter into a written contract. Moreover, the fact that Cedar Street used
EVCO's bid in its prime bid is immaterial. See Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 ldaho 396, 399, 582 P.2d
1074, 1077 (1978); see also C.H Leavell & Co. v. Grafe &Assoc., Inc., 90 Idaho 502,514,414 P.2d
873,879 (1966) ("Mere use of respondent's bid is not tantamount to an acceptance"). There is no
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dispute that EVCO did supply some materials to the project, however, it did not do so pursuant to
an express agreement or any directive from Cedar Street.
Based on Cedar Street and EVCO's repeated attempts to reach an agreement, including a
review of contract documents, it is clear the parties intended their negotiations to conclude with a
written contract. Just like Jntermountain, Mitchell and C.H. Leavell, no expressed contract between
EVCO and Cedar Street existed because the required written mutual assent never occurred without
an executed written agreement. Seaboard respectfully requests that the case be reversed and
remanded.

2.

No Express Contract Was Formed Because the Parties Proposed Different
Terms and No Acceptance of Either Party's Proposals Occurred.

The question of whether an express contract existed between EVCO and Cedar Street and
the scope of any such contract is a question oflaw for the court to decide. EV CO failed to prove the
existence of an express contract at trial and the district court misapplied the law to the facts in
finding that there was such a contract, Seaboard disputes the district court's application oflaw to the
findings of fact. "Appellate judges defer to findings of fact based upon substantial evidence, but they
review freely the conclusions oflaw reached by stating legal rules or principles and applying them
to the facts found." See Haight v. Dales Used Cars, Inc., 139 ldaho 853, 855, 87 P.3d 962, 965 (Ct.
App. 2003). Consequently, this Court reviews the district court's analysis to the findings of fact de
nova.

EVCO asserts that the district comt correctly found an express contract because "[t]he
absence of evidence can be substantial evidence. There were obvious material gaps in evidence to

5

support Seaboard's case at trial and on appeal." (Respondent's Brief, p. 16). Not only does EVCO
admit that it has no affirmative evidence of an express contract, it confuses which party carried the
burden of proof at trial. Seaboard did not have to disprove the existence of an express contract. It
was EVCO's duty to prove that an express contract (or even an implied contract) existed. EVCO
specifically pied that it had a written contract with Cedar Street. (R. at 9). Because it was unable
to sustain its burden of providing the existence of an express contract, in its post-trial Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, EVCO had no choice but to admit that at least a portion
of EV CO and Cedar Street's alleged contractual relationship was implied.2 Moreover, prior to trial,
the district court held in its summary judgment ruling that EVCO did not have a express contract
with Cedar Street, stating"[u]ndispnted facts reveal that there was never an express contract between
EVCO and Cedar Street." (R. at 245). Accordingly, the trial should have been, at best for EVCO,
limited to evaluating whether EVCO established any implied contractual damages. Instead, the
district court created an express contract between EV CO and Cedar Street, absent any proof of a
meeting of the minds, and contrary to EVCO's own admissions.
EVCO details a laundry list of"absent evidence" that allegedly supports its express contract
claim. This analysis, however, turns the burden of proof upside down. EVCO had to prove the
existence of an express contract, not the lack of evidence to refute the existence of an express
contract. For example, EVCO claims that no one at Cedar Street ever informed EVCO it would not
proceed without a written or signed contract. Such evidence does nothing to establish the existence

2

See Motion to Augment, Exhibit 2, p. 6. EVCO never provides any explanation as to
which portion of the contract was allegedly expressed and which portion was implied.
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of an express agreement. EVCO ignores that Cedar Street provided a written subcontract for the
work that was blank as to the scope of the work and price, which directly contradicts a "meeting of
the minds," and an express contract. (Ex. F). Further, Cedar Street expected a written contract and
indicated its intention to enter into a written contract. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 64, 1. 2-7; p. 78, 1. 22-25; Ex.
14). EVCO similarly looked to contract by a written purchase order or written subcontract. (Tr. Vol.
II, p. 20, I. 15 - p. 21, 1. 2).
EVCO repeats the district court's finding that "the conduct of the parties shows a meeting
of the minds occurred and a contract was formed .... " (R. at 262). In addition, EVCO cites the
following from the Court's Order:
The "scope of work" was delineated in Exhibit 18. EVCO was told to begin work
in Exhibit 14. Exhibit 18 establishes the contract price. EVCO did the work called
for in Exhibit 18. Accordingly, Cedar Street, Ormond Builders, and the School
District received the benefit of EVCO's work, and those exhibits establish the
contract price.
(R. at 270) (emphasis added). These statements illustrates the fundamental error in the district

court's application of contract law. An express contract is not found by the "conduct of the parties,"
or valued by a "receipt of the benefit" of work, but by an actual expression of assent. The court only
looks to the conduct of the parties when there is no express contract. If there is no express contract,
the court then must resort to a review of the evidence to determine if the conduct of the parties
reflected a contractual relationship that is implied by the parties' conduct. As this Court has made
clear, when no express contract exists, the conduct of the parties may illustrate an implied contract.
See Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754,767,979 P.2d 627,640
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(1999)(citing Continental Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739,518 P.2d 1201
(1974) ("[T]here is the implied in fact contract wherein there is no express agreement but the

conduct ofthe parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract exists.")( emphasis
added). EVCO makes no effort to illustrate how the "conduct of the parties" demonstrates the
existence of an express agreement or "receiv[ing] the benefit of EVCO' s work" allows it to recover
expectation damages.
Even if the district court properly concluded that it needed to review the conduct of the
parties to determine if there was a "meeting of the minds," to prove the existence of an express
contract, the evidence does not support such a finding. EVCO relies on Barry v. Pacific West Const.,
Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 103 P.3d 440 (2004), to demonstrate there was a "meeting of the minds" to

support an express agreement, but fails to demonstrate how Barry supports such a finding. As this
Court has previously set forth, the requirements for a meeting of the minds is exacting:
The minds of the parties must meet as to all of its terms, and, if any portion of the
proposed terms is unsettled and unprovided for, there is no contract. An offer to
enter into a contractual relation must be so complete that upon acceptance an
agreement is formed which contains all of the terms necessary to determine whether
the contract has been perfo1med or not. An acceptance of an offer, to be effectual,
must be identical with the offer and unconditional, and must not modify or introduce
any new terms into the offer. An acceptance which varies from the terms of the offer
is a rejection of the offer and is a counter proposition, which must in tum be accepted
by the offerer in order to constitute a binding contract.
CH Leavell v. Grafe & Assoc., Inc., 90 Idaho 502,511,414 P.2d 873,877 (1966) (internal citations

omitted). The "conduct of the parties" is not sufficient to establish a meeting of the minds necessary
for an express agreement. Rather, "conduct of the pa.rties" is by definition the evidence which, at

best, establishes an implied in fact contract. EVCO repeatedly states that Cedar Street never rejected
Exhibit 18 as the contract, but can point to no evidence that Cedar Street expressly accepted Exhibit
18, or any other document, as the express contract. Further, Cedar Street manifestly rejected Exhibit
18 when it provided its own written subcontract that added a number of additional terms and left
blank the parties' agreement as to the scope of work and price.
More important, Barry does not support a finding of an express agreement. What is required
for an express contract to be created according to Barry is a preliminary agreement pursuant to
which the parties acted.

EVCO can demonstrate no express agreement, at any stage of the

negotiations, preliminary or not. There is no evidence that Cedar Street ever "accepted" any of
EVCO's bids orally or in writing. Cedar Street even refused to execute the proposed joint check
agreement because it had not reached an agreement with EVCO as to the scope of the work. (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 128, I. 19 - p. 131, I. 21 ). Cedar Street's actions are legally insufficient for mutual assent
and formation of an express contract. Cedar Street's only commitment was an intent to enter into
a written contract in the future, i.e., preliminary negotiations and a request for EVCO to provide back
cans, which is legally insufficient to form an express contract. (Ex. 14). At best, EVCO and Cedar
Street had an express agreement for EVCO to provide the back cans for the Project. Moreover, if
Cedar Street had accepted EVCO's offer by its words on June 14, 2008, in Exhibit 14, it would have
included the scope and price from Exhibit 14 in its proposed subcontract sent to EVCO on June 22,
2008. (Ex. F).
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Further, Cedar Street's subcontract, which it provided to EVCO in response to receiving
Exhibit 14, proposed substantially different terms than in Exhibit 14. Cedar Street's proposed
agreement provided to EVCO on June 22, 2004, set forth payment requirements; changes, additions,
and deductions limitations; timeliness and delay damages; indemnity provisions, workers
compensation requirements, bonding requirements, insurance requirements, etc. (Ex. F., p. 2-5).
These additional terms were never accepted by EVCO and were essential elements to Cedar Street's
willingness to expressly contract with EVCO. See C. H Leavell & Co. v. Grafe & Assocs., Inc., 90
Idaho 502, 5 I 1,414 P.2d 873, 876-77 (1966) (finding no meeting of the minds as to scope of work
and requirement to furnish a performance bond). Cedar Street expected EVCO to be bound by the
same terms Cedar Street had with Ormond Builders. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 43, I. 17-p. 44, I. 25; Ex. M).
The district court dismissed the proposed subcontract as a "form contract" (R., p. 240), but Cedar
Street provided uncontested testimony that it rejected any form contracts it reviewed and specifically
chose to copy Ormond Builders' contract as its contract with EVCO. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 43, l. 17 - p. 44,

I. 25; Ex. F). Cedar Street went to extra-ordinary lengths to submit a draft written subcontract to
EVCO.
In addition, EV CO attempts to suggest that the default judgment entered against Cedar Street
somehow illustrates Cedar Street's agreement with an alleged express contract. The issue is both
irrelevant and misrepresents the record. Cedar Street contested the entr/ of default, asserting EVCO
never provided service ofprocess. 3 Further, Cedar Street's default is irrelevant to EVCO's claim

3

See Seaboard's Motion to Augment the Record, Exhibit 3, p. 1-2.
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against the bond. 74 Am. Jur. Suretyship §§ 20 and 88 (2008). Cedar Street provided testimony that
it never reached an express agreement with EVCO. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 64, I. 2-7; p. 78, I. 22-25).
The district court erred because the facts failed to support a legal conclusion of an express
agreement when there was no evidence of mutual assent or a meeting of the minds.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING EVCO EXPECTATION
DAMAGES.
Assuming a contract existed, the district court's findings of fact could only support a legal

conclusion that at best, there was an implied in fact contract between Cedar Street and EVCO. Even
EVCO admitted that its contract with Cedar Street was part express and part implied.4 (Motion to
Augment, Ex. 2, p. 6). As there was no evidence of an express contract, any damages that could be
awarded pursuant to that theory were improperly awarded and should be reversed on appeal. An
implied in fact contract only supports "payment at reasonable rates for [EVCO's] time and
expenses," Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 708, 52 P.3d 848, 854 (2002), also
referred to as quantum meruit damages. See Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 659-61, 55 I P.2d
610, 614-16 (1976). 5 Ifan implied contract is found to exist, at best EVCO would only be able to
recover reasonable rates for its time and expenses, as demonstrated by the evidence at trial. EVCO
was unable to provide any evidence to support a recovery under an implied contract, other than its
accounting report admitted as Exhibit 22, which set forth EVCO's costs and labor charges, i.e.,

4

See Seaboard's Motion to Augment the Record, Exhibit 11, p. 6.

5

Appellants previously referred to EVCO's alleged damages under an implied in fact
contract as "reliance damages." Based on Peavey, those damages are more appropriately referred
to as quantum meruit damages.
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quantum meruit damages, for an implied contract. Mr. Bauer admitted Exhibit 22 included all of
the materials and labor tracked on the Project, a total of$51,l 08.63. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 25, I. 24 - p. 26,
l. 2; p. 27, l. I I-24). EVCO was paid more than this amount. (Ex. 24; Tr. Vol. II, p. l 37, l. 21 - p.

140, I. 19; p. 205, I. l - p. 207, I. !). Consequently, Cedar Street was paid in excess of its quantum
meruit recovery. The Court should reverse the district court's grant of expectation damages awarded
to EVCO. EVCO's recovery, if any, should be limited to its implied in fact contract damages, i.e.,
quantum meruit damages, as set forth in Exhibit 22.

C.

EVCO'S NOTICE OF CLAIM AND ACTION WERE UNTIMELY UNDER THE
IDAHO PUBLIC CONTRACT BOND ACT.
EVCO cannot demonstrate it timely filed its notice of claim with Seaboard, a condition

precedent to recovery under the bond. In its brief, EVCO cites to United States ex rel. Interstate
Mechanical v. International Fidelity Insurance Co., 200 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2000), arguing that the
district court appears to have adopted the rule from that case that "the correction-or-repair versus
original-contract test presents a useful framework to determine when the Miller Act's statute of
limitations begins to run." (Respondent's Brief, p. 24). 6 However, it is unclear from the district
court's Order what standard the court applied, as it provided no legal explanation or support for its
conclusion that the training on April 15, 2005, the installation of the television system on April 26,
2005, and the completion of as-built drawings on June 15, 2005, were all original scope work, the
completion of which triggered the running of the statute oflimitation. (R., p. 271 ). Further, EVCO's

6

The law in Idaho is well-settled that consideration of federal decisions under the Miller
Act is appropriate in interpreting the Idaho Public Contracts Bond Act. See Beco Corp. v.
Roberts & Sons Const Co, Inc., 114 Idaho 704, 712, 760 P.2d 1120, 1128 (1988).
12

reference to the rule in International Fidelity ignores the court's explanation of the "correction-orrepair versus original-contract" test, and misses the point, as explained below, that not every item
in the original contract is "original contract work" for the purposes of the Miller Act. 7 Interestingly,
even if the district court had applied the International Fidelity standard, the training, television finetuning and submission of the as-built drawings would not have been considered part of the original
contract work. As set out in its initial brief, a thorough explanation by International Fidelity of what
constitutes "when the last labor was performed or material supplied" makes this point clear:
We agree with the majority of courts that have interpreted the phrase and have
concluded it connotes more than mere substantial completion or substantial
performance of the plaintiffs obligations under its contract. See United States es rel.
Austin v. Western Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 1964). Furthermore, we
agree that work done at the request of the government and pursuant to a warranty,
subsequent to final inspection and acceptance of the project, falls outside the
meaning of labor performed as set forth in § 270b(b ). If post-completion work
performed pursuant to a warranty could toll the Miller Act's statute oflimitations,
then the surety would have no repose until all such warranties expired ....

The majority of circuits that have addressed this issue have held that remedial
or corrective work or materials, or inspection of work already completed, falls
outside the meaning of "labor" or "materials" under § 270b(b). Hence,
performing such work or supplying such materials will not toll the Miller Act's
one-year statute oflimitations. See, e.g., United States.for the use ofBillows Elec.
Supply Co. v. E.JT. Constr. Co., Inc., 517 Supp. 1178, 1181 (E.D.Pa. 1981), aff'd.
688 F.2d 827 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 856, 103 S.Ct. 126, 74 L.Ed. 109
(1982); United States for the use of Magna Masonry, Inc., v. R. T. Woodfield, Inc.,
709 F.2d 249,250 (4 th Cir. 1983); United States ex rel. Austin v. Western Elec., 337

7

Seaboard submits EVCO's simplistic analysis ignores the reality that warranty work and
punch-list work are required typically by contract and thus, susceptible to the moniker "original
contract" work. Clearly, however, warranty and punch-list work do not extend the time to
provide the 90 day notice or commence the action within one year. See International Fidelity,
200 F.3d at 459-60 (6th Cir. 2000).
13

F.2d 568,572 (9 th Cir. 1964); United States/or the use a/State Elec. Supply Co. v.
Hesse/den Constr. Co., 404 F.2d 774, 776 (10 th Cir. 1968).

International Fidelity, 200 F.3d at 459-60 (6th Cir. 2000). Importantly, the International Fidelity
Court went on to clarify: "[a) contractor's duties under a contract may extend, by virtue of
warrant or other obligation, to a point in time far beyond that date when the project has been
completed and the 'last of the labor was performed or material was supplied' for purposes of
the Miller Act." Id. (emphasis added). Such conduct does not change the date oflast performance
for purposes of the Miller Act.
EVCO's argument that the activities conducted on April 15, April 26 and June 15, 2005 are
"labor" and "materials" for the purposes of the Miller Act takes the "correction-or-repair versus
original contract test" far too literally and misinterprets the standard developed by the Court. As
stated in International Fidelity, warranty or other obligations under a contract may extend beyond
the date of completion of the project, but do not automatically extend the trigger date for the statute
oflimitations. Id. The training, the television system balancing, and submission ofas-built drawings
all fall into the "warranty or other obligations" category. The mere fact that these items and activities
may have been included in the original contract does not transfonn them into "labor or materials"
under the Miller Act. Upon closer examination of the contract and testimony at trial, it is clear that
these particular items and activities are not the type of labor or materials to trigger the statute of
limitations.
The fire alarms and intercom system training did not pertain to the actual construction of the
project. It was conducted two and a half months after the School District took possession of the

14

building and began using it as a school. (Ex. 21 ). Further, the contract clause addressing the
intercom training session reads as follows:
The Contractor shall provide three training periods of four hours each. The first
session shall be immediately after occupancy. The second session shall be 30-60
days after the first. The last training period shall be scheduled at the end of the 12
month warranty period. A training plan shall be submitted in advance for approval,
outline the topics to be covered, the publications to be used, and the training
schedule. The training shall be conducted by personnel thoroughly familiar with the
system and its features.
(Ex. 0, Section 16760, 4f 3.03(F)).
The training contemplated in the contract is exactly the type of work the Sixth Circuit
excludes from "original contract work" in International Fidelity. The training was undertaken after
the School District took possession and began conducting classes. For all intents and purposes, at
that point the building was functionally complete. Pursuant to the contract, the intercom training was
to be done only after occupancy and the final training was to be conducted at the end of the warranty
period. Thus, the training constitutes an obligation that extends beyond the date the project was
completed, and the dates upon which it occurred cannot be used to measure the last date upon which
labor was supplied to the Project.
Similarly, the television balance work is not the type of work that can be used to establish
the last date of work under the Miller Act. Although this work may have been contemplated in the
original contract, it is important to note that the School District took occupancy of the building on
January 28, 2005. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 227, I. 1-25). Thus, the building had been functionally complete
and in use for roughly three months by the time EVCO undertook to balance the system. The
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balancing was work done as a follow-up to completion of the electrical work on the Project. When
the Schoo! District took possession of the building in January, it was already substantially complete
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 227, L 1-7) and the low-level electrical systems were tested, inspected and operational.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 231, 1. 9-24; Ex. Q; Ex. 25). The incidental nature of the balancing work was the type
of work that extended beyond the time EVCO had completed its work. Thus, the date on which
EVCO performed the balancing of the television system should not be used to determine the date
on which the statute oflimitations began running on EVCO' s notice and claim.
Finally, the as-built drawings were post-Project work, and can not be used as the date upon
which the statute oflimitations begins to run for claims under the Miller Act. Production of as-built
drawings require by their very nature that the project be complete. They are not used to construct
the project. Like the television balancing and training, production of as-built drawings constituted
incidental work done after the completion of the Project. Therefore, the submission of the as-built
drawings on June 15, 2005 cannot serve as the last date labor or materials were provided by EVCO
on the project.
Based on EVCO's billing statements, the last "labor" EVCO performed on the project for
the purposes of the Idaho Public Contracts Bond Act was on February 11, 2005. Trial testimony was
unequivocal that EVCO did not bill for any labor not yet performed. Stated otherwise, the work
included in EVCO's February 11 th invoice was work that was completed at the time ofbilling. 8 (Tr.

8

Glaringly absent from EVCO's Brief is any explanation as to its obvious alterations of
its billing invoices. EVCO's original final billing (Invoice No. 6710) submitted with its Proof of
Claim was dated February 11, 2005 (see Exhibit 2, Bates No. 298). EVCO's notice to Ormond
Builders under Idaho Code § 54-1927 was sent June 8, 2005, or 117 days after its "Final Billing."
16

Vol. II, p. 24, 1.3-22). As stated above, the School District took possession of the building and
began conducting classes on January 28, 2005. All of the electrical systems, including those for
which EVCO supplied material and some labor, were completed and functional. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 231,

1. 9-24). The electrical systems were certified as 100% complete by March 1, 2005. (Ex. Q). Any
work EVCO claims it perfonned after that date was merely incidental to completion ofits role in the
Project on the electrical system.
Additionally, because the Idaho Public Bonds Act is the public works equivalent of the Idaho
Mechanics and Materialmans Lien statute, it is appropriate to examine cases construing the lien
statute to determine the parameters of the Bond Act. See LeGrand Steel Prods., Co. v. A.S.
Constructors, Inc., 108 Idaho 817, 819, 702 P.2d 855, 857 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, in this case,
the bond itself defines the item a claimant can assert a claim for in terms of what may be covered by
a mechanic's lien:
Claimant: An individual or entity having a direct contract with the Contractor or with
a subcontractor of the Contractor to furnish labor, materials or equipment for use in
the performance of the Contract. The intent of this Bond shall be to include without
limitation in the tenns "labor, materials or equipment" that part of water, gas, power,
light, heat, oil, gasoline, telephone service or rental equipment used in the
Construction Contract, architectural and engineering services required for
performance of the work of the Contractor and the Contractor's subcontractors, and
all other items for which a mechanic's lien may be asserted in the jurisdiction
where the labor, materials or equipment were furnished.
(Ex. 1, Payment Bond,, 15.1). Thus, it is proper to evaluate EVCO's claim based upon Idaho law
pertaining to Idaho's Mechanics and Materialmans Lien statute.

At trial, EVCO submitted an aliered final Invoice No. 6710 dated March 22, 2005 (see Exhibit
20, Bates No. 120), which would make its June 8, 2005, notice timely under the Idaho Public
Bonds Act. Incidentally, the alteration of EV CO Invoice No. 6710 also makes its complaint
timely or untimely under Idaho Code§ 54-1927. See Complaint filed March 10, 2006.

Under Idaho's Mechanics and Materialmans Lien statute, a party could not obtain a
mechanic's lien for training on fire alarms and intercom systems, television systems balancing, or
as-built drawings submissions. See Idaho Code§ 45-50 I .9 Additionally, under Idaho law substantial
completion is when the statute of limitations begins to run in a private works project. See H W
Johns-Mannville Co. v. Allen, 37 Idaho 153,215 P. 840 (1923) and Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho

228, 506 P.2d 455 (1972). "Trivial work" or materials furnished after substantial completion will
not extend the time in which a lien claim can be filed under the lien statute. Mitchell, 95 Idaho at
231-232, 506 P.2d at 458-459. Substantial completion on this Project was on January 28, 2005,
9

Idaho Code§ 45-501 reads as follows:

RJGHT TO LIEN. Every person performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to be
used in the construction, alteration or repair of any mining claim, building, wharf, bridge, ditch,
dike, flume, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, wagon road, aqueduct to create hydraulic power,
or any other structure, or who grades, fills in, levels, surfaces or otherwise improves any land, or
who performs labor in any mine or mining claim, and every professional engineer or licensed
surveyor under contract who prepares or furnishes designs, plru1s, plats, maps, specifications,
drawings, surveys, estimates of cost, on-site observation or supervision, or who renders any other
professional service whatsoever for which he is legally authorized to perform in connection with
any land or building development or improvement, or to establish boundaries, has a lien upon the
same for the work or labor done or professional services or materials furnished, whether done or
furnished at the instance of the owner of the building or other improvement or his agent; and
every contractor, subcontractor, architect, builder or any person having charge of any mining
claim, or of the construction, alteration or repair, either in whole or in part, of any building or
other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be held to be the agent of the owner for the purpose of this
chapter: provided, that the lessee or lessees of any mining claim shall not be considered as the
agent or agents of the owner under the provisions of this chapter.
For purposes of this chapter the term "furnishing material" shall also include,
notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, supplying, renting or leasing
equipment, materials or fixtures as defined in section 28-12-309, Idaho Code.
"Furnishing material" shall also include renting, leasing or otherwise supplying any
equipment, materials, fixtures or machinery to any mine or mining claim.
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when the building could be used for the purpose for which it was intended. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 227, I. 125). Under Idaho law, any work EVCO performed after the point of substantial completion could
not toll the statute of limitations for the filing of notice and claim, and EVCO' s filing of notice on
and claim were untimely. 10
Alternatively, even if the Court does not apply the substantial completion standard, EVCO's
February 11, 2005, invoice indicates that the last possible date EVCO provided labor or materials
on the Project was February 11, 2005. 11 Both EVCO's notice and claim were untimely. The district
court's judgment should be reversed and remanded. EVCO failed to comply with Idaho Code § 541927.

D.

THE IDAHO STATUTE OF FRAUDS BARS EVCO'S CLAIM AGAINST
SEABOARD.
EVCO has repeated the district court's conclusion regarding the statute of frauds, but has

failed to explain how Idaho Code§ 28-2-201 applies to Seaboard based on the plain language of the
statute. Idaho Code§ 28-2-201 requires any contract for the purchase and sale of goods in excess
of $500.00 to be in writing and signed by the party against whom the enforcement is sought (i.e.,

10

Based upon the January 28, 2005 date of substantial completion, EVCO' s notice was
mailed 131 days late and received 135 days late, well past the 90 day statutory deadline.
Furthern10re, EVCO missed the deadline for filing suit by roughly a month and a half.
11

As Mr. Bauer testified, EVCO bills for its work only after it has completed the work
identified in the invoice, and therefore EVCO's invoices reflect labor or materials supplied as of
the date of the invoice. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 24, I. 3-22). It should be noted that after having
submitted the February 11, 2005 invoice as part of its proof of claim and swearing to is accuracy
under penalty fo perjury, EVCO submitted an altered invoice at trial dated March 22, 2005,
seemingly in order to render the notice and filing of its suit timely. Apparently, at a loss to
explain the discrepancy, EVCO simply ignores it on appeal.
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Cedar Street). Moreover, the Project specifications required such contracts to be in writing. (Ex.
N, p. 23). The district court held the exception set forth at§ 28-2-201(2) took the transaction out
of the statute of frauds because there was no written objection by Cedar Street and both parties were
"merchants." Additionally, the district court held that§ 28-2-201(3)(c) took the matter outside of
the statute of frauds, because payment had been received.

1.

The Exception 28-2-201{2} Does Not Apply to Seaboard.

Neither the district court nor EVCO in their analysis correctly applied the plain language of
§ 28-2-201(2). The statute of frauds exception found at subsection (2) states:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the
contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against
such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten (10)
days after it is received.
Idaho Statute of Frauds§ 28-2-201(2). The plain text is clear and simple to apply. The exception
does not apply as against a third party - Seaboard. Seaboard should be entitled to the protections
ofidaho Code § 28-2-201 (1) based on its clear and unambiguous meaning. Official comment No. 3
to the provision also supports Seaboard's construction.

2.

The I.C. § 28-2-201(3)(c) Exception for Payment.

Likewise, the plain language of§ 28-2-201 (3)(c) indicates EVCO' s claims are barred by the
statute of frauds. EVCO claims its alleged contract was taken out of the statute of frauds because
it has been paid for its performance. If such is the case, then its claims against Seaboard fails
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because it has been paid for its performance. As with the previous exception, such may be valid as
against a statute of frauds defense asserted by Cedar Street, but not Seaboard.
E.

EVCO IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL UNDER ANY
THEORY.

I.

EVCO Is Not Entitled to Fees Under Idaho Code§ 54-1929 (Bond Actions).

EVCO first requests an award of attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 54-1929.
However, the statute makes no reference to the award of attorney's fees on appeal. The Idaho Court
of Appeals has found that attorney's fees are not properly awarded on appeal under § 54-1929. See
LeGrand Steel Prods., Co. v. A.S. Constructors, Inc., 108 Idaho 817, 819, 702 P.2d 855, 857 (Ct.

App. 1985) (fees on appeal denied to prevailing subcontractor); EIMCO Div. ofEnvirotech Corp.
v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 109 Idaho 762, 765, 710 P.2d 672, 675 (Ct. App. 1985) (fees on appeal

denied to prevailing surety). 12 In LeGrand, the Court of Appeals stated that§ 54-1929 is analogous
to Idaho's mechanic's lien statute regarding attorney's fees, Idaho Code§ 45-513. The lien statute
is likewise silent on the issue of attorney's fees on appeal, and "has been held not to authorize fee
awards on appeal." LeGrand Steel Prods., l 08 Idaho at 819. Therefore, where the question of fees
on appeal was apparently a substantive issue before the Court, the Court of Appeals reasoned,

12

Seaboard acknowledges there are Idaho Supreme Court cases predating the above
cases wherein the Court awarded attorney's fees under§ 54-1929. See, e.g., City of Weippe v.
Yarno, 96 Idaho 319,528 P.2d 201 (1974); Consolidated Concrete Co., v. Empire Masonry, 100
Idaho 234, 596 P.2d 106 (1979); H-K Contractors, Inc., v. City ofFirth, l O1 Idaho 224, 611 P.2d
1009 (1979). However, none of these cases explain why the Court allowed for attorney's fees on
appeal and it does not appear the issue of fees on appeal was a contested issue. Though these
cases present conflicting precedent, the holdings in the more recent Court of Appeals cases
explain why attorney's fees are not appropriate on appeal under§ 54-1929.
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attorney's fees on appeal are barred under§ 54-1929. Thus, EVCO may not receive attorney's fees
under that statute on appeal.
EVCO cites to Oldcastle Precast, Inc. v. ParkTowne Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 376, 128 P.3d
913 (2005), for the proposition that attorney's fees are awardable under§ 54-1929. Oldcastle does
not address attorney's fees on appeal under§ 54-1929, other than to deny them to both parties. In

Oldcastle, the surety paid Oldcastle principal and interest owed under the subcontract on the first day
of trial, leaving only a counterclaim for breach of contract. See Oldcastle Precast, Inc., v.

ParkTowne Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 376, 377, 128 P.3d 913, 914 (2005). Oldcastle was awarded
attorney's fees by the district court for all attorney's fees incurred up to the date it was paid all sums
due under the bond. Oldcastle then attempted to collect attorney's fees under § 54-1929 for
successfully defending against the counterclaim. The district court held, and the Idaho Supreme
Court affirmed, that once the bond company paid Oldcastle all sums owing under the subcontract,
the action ceased to be an action upon the bond, thus removing an award of attorney's fees under§
54-1929 after the bond was paid.
The situation in Oldcastle is not only factually different from the case at hand, the holding
of the case pertains to whether attorney's fees can be awarded under§ 54-1929 when a cause of
action on a bond no longer exists. All O/dcastle states that is remotely related to whether attorney's
fees are allowable on appeal under § 54-1929 is the following:
Both parties request attorneys' fees on appeal. Oldcastle requests attorney fees under
Idaho Code§ 54-1929. Because Oldcastle is not the prevailing party and this is not
an appeal from a judgment upon the payment bond, 0 Idcastle is not entitled to an
award of attorney fees under that statute.
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Oldcastle, 142 Idaho at 379. Although the dissent in Oldcastle includes an extensive discussion

concerning attorney's fees under§ 54-1929 on appeal, the majority declined to award attorney's fees
on appeal based upon the issues tried and appealed. Similar to the factual setting in Oldcastle,
EVCO was paid all that it was entitled to under an implied in fact contract.
Because Idaho case law indicates that where the claim of attorney's fees on appeal was
apparently a contested legal issue, Idaho courts have declined to award fees on appeal, EVCO is not
entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to§ 54-1929.

2.

EVCO Is Not Entitled to Fees on Appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).

EVCO also seeks attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) which provides:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods,
wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). EVCO argues that this provision is applicable because this case is "an
appeal from a civil action to recover on Seaboard's guaranty relating to EVCO's sale of goods and
services." (Respondent's Brief, p.13). What EVCO ignores is that it had no contractual relationship
with Seaboard. The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted § 120(3) to require a contract or
commercial transaction as between the parties in order to trigger the right to fees under § 120(3).
See BECO Const. Co. v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, _, 184 P.3d 844,851 (2008) (denying

the claim for fees under§ 12-120(3) because there was no "commercial transaction" as between the
parties); Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466,472, 36 P.3d 218,
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224 (200 I )(same). Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has found that "attorneys' fees under § 12120(3) are unavailable when the claim is controlled by a statutory provision." Willie v. Board of
Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59 P.3d 302, 307 (2002)(internal citations omitted). "[ A]ttorney fees

are unavailable under§ 12-120(3) for statutory claims only when the statute upon which the claim
is brought includes its own attorney fees provision." Id.

Idaho Code § 54-1929 specifically

addresses attorney's fees in a bond action. Therefore, EV CO is not entitled to attorney's fees under

§ 12-120(3).

3.

EVCO Is Not Entitled to Fees Under Idaho Code§ 12-121.

EVCO also asserts that it.is entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121 because
"Seaboard's appeal is brought and pursued unreasonably and without foundation." (Respondent's
Brief, p. 14). EVCO states that Seaboard is asking the Court to second guess the district court's
decisions regarding conflicting evidence. (Respondent's Brief, p. 14). That assertion is simply
incorrect. Seaboard seeks to have the Court clarify areas oflaw because the district coutt incorrectly
applied the law to this case and contrary to EVCO's own admissions. The Court will not award
attorney's fees where, as here, "the losing party brought the appeal in good faith and where a genuine
issue oflaw was presented." Merrill v. Gibson, 139 Idaho 840, 846, 97 P.3d 949, 955 (2004) (citing
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979)).

Additionally, "an appeal is frivolous when the underlying law upon which it relies is well settled and
the appellant makes no substantial showing the district court misapplied the law." Cox v. Cox, 138
Idaho 881, 887, 71 P.3d 1028, 1034 (2003) (citing King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 912, 42 P.3d 698,
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705 (2002)). This appeal is not frivolous, as the issues Seaboard has presented on appeal all pertain
to whether the law was correctly applied.
All of the issues raised on appeal pertain to matters of law. Contrary to EVCO' s claim,
Seaboard has asked the Court to "clarify ... existing standards," (Respondent's Brief, citing Scott

v. Castle, 104 Idaho 719, 726-27, 662 P.2d 1163, 1170-71 (1983)) as there is a conflict between
existing Idaho case law and the law applied by the district court. Thus, Seaboard's appeal is not
frivolous, and EVCO is not entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121.
UL CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Seaboard respectfully requests that the case be reversed and
remanded for an Order to be entered setting forth that EVCO's notice and claim are untimely and
that no contract was formed between EVCO and Cedar Street. If this Court finds that notice and
claim was timely and that an implied contract existed between EVCO and Cedar Street, Seaboard
respectfully requests that the Court finds that EVCO has already been paid its quantum meruit
measure of damages, and that it is entitled to no further recovery from Seaboard. Finally, Seaboard
also respectfully requests that this Court find that EVCO is not entitled to recover any attorney's
fees.
u~

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _1_1 day of November, 2008.

Frederick J. Hahn, III
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
Appellant Seaboard Surety Company
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